Add libotr/etc sources

1 files changed, 2673 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/libotr/libgcrypt-1.8.7/random/random-drbg.c b/libotr/libgcrypt-1.8.7/random/random-drbg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed04e2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libotr/libgcrypt-1.8.7/random/random-drbg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2673 @@
+/* random-drbg.c - Deterministic Random Bits Generator
+ * Copyright 2014 Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ *
+ * DRBG: Deterministic Random Bits Generator
+ *       Based on NIST Recommended DRBG from NIST SP800-90A with the following
+ *       properties:
+ *		* CTR DRBG with DF with AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 cores
+ * 		* Hash DRBG with DF with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 cores
+ * 		* HMAC DRBG with DF with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 cores
+ * 		* with and without prediction resistance
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * LGPLv2+, in which case the provisions of the LGPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the LGPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+ * DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *
+ * gcry_control GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT
+ * ================================
+ * This control request re-initializes the DRBG completely, i.e. the entire
+ * state of the DRBG is zeroized (with two exceptions listed in
+ * GCRYCTL_DRBG_SET_ENTROPY).
+ *
+ * The control request takes the following values which influences how
+ * the DRBG is re-initialized:
+ *
+ *  - const char *flagstr
+ *
+ *      This variable specifies the DRBG type to be used for the next
+ *	initialization.  If set to NULL, the previous DRBG type is
+ *	used for the initialization.  If not NULL a space separated
+ *	list of tokens with associated flag values is expected which
+ *	are ORed to form the mandatory flags of the requested DRBG
+ *	strength and cipher type.  Optionally, the prediction
+ *	resistance flag can be ORed into the flags variable.
+ *
+ *      | String token | Flag value             |
+ *      |--------------+------------------------|
+ *      | aes          | DRBG_CTRAES            |
+ *      | serpent      | DRBG_CTRSERPENT        |
+ *      | twofish      | DRBG_CTRTWOFISH        |
+ *      | sha1         | DRBG_HASHSHA1          |
+ *      | sha256       | DRBG_HASHSHA256        |
+ *      | sha512       | DRBG_HASHSHA512        |
+ *      | hmac         | DRBG_HMAC              |
+ *      | sym128       | DRBG_SYM128            |
+ *      | sym192       | DRBG_SYM192            |
+ *      | sym256       | DRBG_SYM256            |
+ *      | pr           | DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST |
+ *
+ *    For example:
+ *
+ * 	- CTR-DRBG with AES-128 without prediction resistance:
+ * 	    "aes sym128"
+ * 	- HMAC-DRBG with SHA-512 with prediction resistance:
+ * 	    "hmac sha512 pr"
+ *
+ *  - gcry_buffer_t *pers
+ *
+ *      NULL terminated array with personalization strings to be used
+ *	for initialization.
+ *
+ *  - int npers
+ *
+ *     Size of PERS.
+ *
+ *  - void *guard
+ *
+ *      A value of NULL must be passed for this.
+ *
+ * The variable of flags is independent from the pers/perslen variables. If
+ * flags is set to 0 and perslen is set to 0, the current DRBG type is
+ * completely reset without using a personalization string.
+ *
+ * DRBG Usage
+ * ==========
+ * The SP 800-90A DRBG allows the user to specify a personalization string
+ * for initialization as well as an additional information string for each
+ * random number request.  The following code fragments show how a caller
+ * uses the API to use the full functionality of the DRBG.
+ *
+ * Usage without any additional data
+ * ---------------------------------
+ * gcry_randomize(outbuf, OUTLEN, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+ *
+ *
+ * Usage with personalization string during initialization
+ * -------------------------------------------------------
+ * drbg_string_t pers;
+ * char personalization[11] = "some-string";
+ *
+ * drbg_string_fill(&pers, personalization, strlen(personalization));
+ * // The reset completely re-initializes the DRBG with the provided
+ * // personalization string without changing the DRBG type
+ * ret = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT, 0, &pers);
+ * gcry_randomize(outbuf, OUTLEN, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+ *
+ *
+ * Usage with additional information string during random number request
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * drbg_string_t addtl;
+ * char addtl_string[11] = "some-string";
+ *
+ * drbg_string_fill(&addtl, addtl_string, strlen(addtl_string));
+ * // The following call is a wrapper to gcry_randomize() and returns
+ * // the same error codes.
+ * gcry_randomize_drbg(outbuf, OUTLEN, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM, &addtl);
+ *
+ *
+ * Usage with personalization and additional information strings
+ * -------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Just mix both scenarios above.
+ *
+ *
+ * Switch the DRBG type to some other type
+ * ---------------------------------------
+ * // Switch to CTR DRBG AES-128 without prediction resistance
+ * ret = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT, DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES128, NULL);
+ * gcry_randomize(outbuf, OUTLEN, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "random.h"
+#include "rand-internal.h"
+#include "../cipher/bufhelp.h"
+
+
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * Constants
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * DRBG flags bitmasks
+ *
+ * 31 (B) 28      19         (A)         0
+ *  +-+-+-+--------+---+-----------+-----+
+ *  |~|~|u|~~~~~~~~| 3 |     2     |  1  |
+ *  +-+-+-+--------+- -+-----------+-----+
+ * ctl flg|        |drbg use selection flags
+ *
+ */
+
+/* Internal state control flags (B) */
+#define DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST	((u32)1<<28)
+
+/* CTR type modifiers (A.1)*/
+#define DRBG_CTRAES		((u32)1<<0)
+#define DRBG_CTRSERPENT		((u32)1<<1)
+#define DRBG_CTRTWOFISH		((u32)1<<2)
+#define DRBG_CTR_MASK	        (DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_CTRSERPENT \
+                                 | DRBG_CTRTWOFISH)
+
+/* HASH type modifiers (A.2)*/
+#define DRBG_HASHSHA1		((u32)1<<4)
+#define DRBG_HASHSHA224		((u32)1<<5)
+#define DRBG_HASHSHA256		((u32)1<<6)
+#define DRBG_HASHSHA384		((u32)1<<7)
+#define DRBG_HASHSHA512		((u32)1<<8)
+#define DRBG_HASH_MASK		(DRBG_HASHSHA1 | DRBG_HASHSHA224 \
+				 | DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HASHSHA384 \
+				 | DRBG_HASHSHA512)
+/* type modifiers (A.3)*/
+#define DRBG_HMAC		((u32)1<<12)
+#define DRBG_SYM128		((u32)1<<13)
+#define DRBG_SYM192		((u32)1<<14)
+#define DRBG_SYM256		((u32)1<<15)
+#define DRBG_TYPE_MASK		(DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_SYM128 | DRBG_SYM192 \
+				 | DRBG_SYM256)
+#define DRBG_CIPHER_MASK        (DRBG_CTR_MASK | DRBG_HASH_MASK \
+                                 | DRBG_TYPE_MASK)
+
+#define DRBG_PR_CTRAES128   (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM128)
+#define DRBG_PR_CTRAES192   (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM192)
+#define DRBG_PR_CTRAES256   (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM256)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES128 (DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM128)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES192 (DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM192)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES256 (DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM256)
+#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA1     (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA1)
+#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA256   (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA256)
+#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA384   (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA384)
+#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA512   (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA512)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA1   (DRBG_HASHSHA1)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA256 (DRBG_HASHSHA256)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA384 (DRBG_HASHSHA384)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA512 (DRBG_HASHSHA512)
+#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA1     (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA1 \
+                              | DRBG_HMAC)
+#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA256   (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA256 \
+                              | DRBG_HMAC)
+#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA384   (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA384 \
+                              | DRBG_HMAC)
+#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA512   (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA512 \
+                              | DRBG_HMAC)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA1   (DRBG_HASHSHA1 | DRBG_HMAC)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA256 (DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HMAC)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA384 (DRBG_HASHSHA384 | DRBG_HMAC)
+#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA512 (DRBG_HASHSHA512 | DRBG_HMAC)
+
+
+/* The default DRGB type.  */
+#define DRBG_DEFAULT_TYPE    DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA256
+
+
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * Common data structures
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * SP800-90A requires the concatenation of different data. To avoid copying
+ * buffers around or allocate additional memory, the following data structure
+ * is used to point to the original memory with its size. In addition, it
+ * is used to build a linked list. The linked list defines the concatenation
+ * of individual buffers. The order of memory block referenced in that
+ * linked list determines the order of concatenation.
+ */
+struct drbg_string_s
+{
+  const unsigned char *buf;
+  size_t len;
+  struct drbg_string_s *next;
+};
+typedef struct drbg_string_s drbg_string_t;
+
+
+/* DRBG input data structure for DRBG generate with additional
+ * information string.  */
+struct drbg_gen_s
+{
+  unsigned char *outbuf;	/* output buffer for random numbers */
+  unsigned int outlen;	        /* size of output buffer */
+  drbg_string_t *addtl;	        /* input buffer for
+				 * additional information string */
+};
+typedef struct drbg_gen_s drbg_gen_t;
+
+
+/* Forward declaration of the state object pointer.  */
+struct drbg_state_s;
+typedef struct drbg_state_s *drbg_state_t;
+
+
+struct drbg_core_s
+{
+  u32 flags;			/* flags for the cipher */
+  ushort statelen;		/* maximum state length */
+  ushort blocklen_bytes;	/* block size of output in bytes */
+  int backend_cipher;		/* libgcrypt backend cipher */
+};
+
+struct drbg_state_ops_s
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t (*update) (drbg_state_t drbg,
+			    drbg_string_t *seed, int reseed);
+  gpg_err_code_t (*generate) (drbg_state_t drbg,
+			      unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+			      drbg_string_t *addtl);
+  gpg_err_code_t (*crypto_init) (drbg_state_t drbg);
+  void		 (*crypto_fini) (drbg_state_t drbg);
+};
+
+struct drbg_test_data_s
+{
+  drbg_string_t *testentropy;	/* TEST PARAMETER: test entropy */
+  int fail_seed_source:1;	/* If set, the seed function will
+                                 * return an error. */
+};
+
+
+/* This state object keeps the state of an DRBG instance.  */
+struct drbg_state_s
+{
+  unsigned char *V;		/* internal state 10.1.1.1 1a) */
+  unsigned char *C;		/* hash: static value 10.1.1.1 1b)
+				 * hmac / ctr: key */
+  size_t reseed_ctr;		/* Number of RNG requests since last reseed --
+				 * 10.1.1.1 1c) */
+  unsigned char *scratchpad;	/* some memory the DRBG can use for its
+				 * operation -- allocated during init */
+  void *priv_data;		/* Cipher handle */
+  gcry_cipher_hd_t ctr_handle;	/* CTR mode cipher handle */
+#define DRBG_CTR_NULL_LEN 128
+  unsigned char *ctr_null;	/* CTR mode zero buffer */
+  int seeded:1;			/* DRBG fully seeded? */
+  int pr:1;			/* Prediction resistance enabled? */
+  /* Taken from libgcrypt ANSI X9.31 DRNG: We need to keep track of the
+   * process which did the initialization so that we can detect a fork.
+   * The volatile modifier is required so that the compiler does not
+   * optimize it away in case the getpid function is badly attributed. */
+  pid_t seed_init_pid;
+  const struct drbg_state_ops_s *d_ops;
+  const struct drbg_core_s *core;
+  struct drbg_test_data_s *test_data;
+};
+
+enum drbg_prefixes
+{
+  DRBG_PREFIX0 = 0x00,
+  DRBG_PREFIX1,
+  DRBG_PREFIX2,
+  DRBG_PREFIX3
+};
+
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))
+
+/***************************************************************
+ * Global variables
+ ***************************************************************/
+
+/* Global state variable holding the current instance of the DRBG.  */
+static drbg_state_t drbg_state;
+
+/* This is the lock variable we use to serialize access to this RNG. */
+GPGRT_LOCK_DEFINE(drbg_lock_var);
+
+
+/***************************************************************
+ * Backend cipher definitions available to DRBG
+ ***************************************************************/
+
+static const struct drbg_core_s drbg_cores[] = {
+  /* Hash DRBGs */
+  {DRBG_HASHSHA1, 55, 20, GCRY_MD_SHA1},
+  {DRBG_HASHSHA256, 55, 32, GCRY_MD_SHA256},
+  {DRBG_HASHSHA384, 111, 48, GCRY_MD_SHA384},
+  {DRBG_HASHSHA512, 111, 64, GCRY_MD_SHA512},
+  /* HMAC DRBGs */
+  {DRBG_HASHSHA1   | DRBG_HMAC, 20, 20, GCRY_MD_SHA1},
+  {DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HMAC, 32, 32, GCRY_MD_SHA256},
+  {DRBG_HASHSHA384 | DRBG_HMAC, 48, 48, GCRY_MD_SHA384},
+  {DRBG_HASHSHA512 | DRBG_HMAC, 64, 64, GCRY_MD_SHA512},
+  /* block ciphers */
+  {DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM128, 32, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128},
+  {DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM192, 40, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192},
+  {DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM256, 48, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256}
+};
+
+static gpg_err_code_t drbg_hash_init (drbg_state_t drbg);
+static gpg_err_code_t drbg_hmac_init (drbg_state_t drbg);
+static gpg_err_code_t drbg_hmac_setkey (drbg_state_t drbg,
+					const unsigned char *key);
+static void drbg_hash_fini (drbg_state_t drbg);
+static byte *drbg_hash (drbg_state_t drbg, const drbg_string_t *buf);
+static gpg_err_code_t drbg_sym_init (drbg_state_t drbg);
+static void drbg_sym_fini (drbg_state_t drbg);
+static gpg_err_code_t drbg_sym_setkey (drbg_state_t drbg,
+				       const unsigned char *key);
+static gpg_err_code_t drbg_sym (drbg_state_t drbg, unsigned char *outval,
+				const drbg_string_t *buf);
+static gpg_err_code_t drbg_sym_ctr (drbg_state_t drbg,
+			const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inbuflen,
+			unsigned char *outbuf, unsigned int outbuflen);
+
+/******************************************************************
+ ******************************************************************
+ ******************************************************************
+ * Generic DRBG code
+ ******************************************************************
+ ******************************************************************
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * Generic helper functions
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+#if 0
+#define dbg(x) do { log_debug x; } while(0)
+#else
+#define dbg(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Parse a string of flags and store the flag values at R_FLAGS.
+ * Return 0 on success.
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+parse_flag_string (const char *string, u32 *r_flags)
+{
+  struct {
+    const char *name;
+    u32 flag;
+  } table[] = {
+    { "aes",     DRBG_CTRAES            },
+    { "serpent", DRBG_CTRSERPENT        },
+    { "twofish", DRBG_CTRTWOFISH        },
+    { "sha1",    DRBG_HASHSHA1          },
+    { "sha256",  DRBG_HASHSHA256        },
+    { "sha512",  DRBG_HASHSHA512        },
+    { "hmac",    DRBG_HMAC              },
+    { "sym128",  DRBG_SYM128            },
+    { "sym192",  DRBG_SYM192            },
+    { "sym256",  DRBG_SYM256            },
+    { "pr",      DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST }
+  };
+
+  *r_flags = 0;
+  if (string)
+    {
+      char **tl;
+      const char *s;
+      int i, j;
+
+      tl = _gcry_strtokenize (string, NULL);
+      if (!tl)
+        return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+      for (i=0; (s=tl[i]); i++)
+        {
+          for (j=0; j < DIM (table); j++)
+            if (!strcmp (s, table[j].name))
+              {
+                *r_flags |= table[j].flag;
+                break;
+              }
+          if (!(j < DIM (table)))
+            {
+              xfree (tl);
+              return GPG_ERR_INV_FLAG;
+            }
+        }
+      xfree (tl);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void
+drbg_string_fill (drbg_string_t *string,
+                       const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+  string->buf = buf;
+  string->len = len;
+  string->next = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline ushort
+drbg_statelen (drbg_state_t drbg)
+{
+  if (drbg && drbg->core)
+    return drbg->core->statelen;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static inline ushort
+drbg_blocklen (drbg_state_t drbg)
+{
+  if (drbg && drbg->core)
+    return drbg->core->blocklen_bytes;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static inline ushort
+drbg_keylen (drbg_state_t drbg)
+{
+  if (drbg && drbg->core)
+    return (drbg->core->statelen - drbg->core->blocklen_bytes);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static inline size_t
+drbg_max_request_bytes (void)
+{
+  /* SP800-90A requires the limit 2**19 bits, but we return bytes */
+  return (1 << 16);
+}
+
+static inline size_t
+drbg_max_addtl (void)
+{
+  /* SP800-90A requires 2**35 bytes additional info str / pers str */
+#ifdef __LP64__
+  return (1UL << 35);
+#else
+  /*
+   * SP800-90A allows smaller maximum numbers to be returned -- we
+   * return SIZE_MAX - 1 to allow the verification of the enforcement
+   * of this value in drbg_healthcheck_sanity.
+   */
+  return (SIZE_MAX - 1);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline size_t
+drbg_max_requests (void)
+{
+  /* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */
+#ifdef __LP64__
+  return (1UL << 48);
+#else
+  return SIZE_MAX;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return strength of DRBG according to SP800-90A section 8.4
+ *
+ * flags: DRBG flags reference
+ *
+ * Return: normalized strength value or 32 as a default to counter
+ * 	   programming errors
+ */
+static inline unsigned short
+drbg_sec_strength (u32 flags)
+{
+  if ((flags & DRBG_HASHSHA1) || (flags & DRBG_SYM128))
+    return 16;
+  else if (flags & DRBG_SYM192)
+    return 24;
+  else if ((flags & DRBG_SYM256) || (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA256) ||
+	   (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA384) || (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA512))
+    return 32;
+  else
+    return 32;
+}
+
+static void
+drbg_add_buf (unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen,
+              unsigned char *add, size_t addlen)
+{
+  /* implied: dstlen > addlen */
+  unsigned char *dstptr, *addptr;
+  unsigned int remainder = 0;
+  size_t len = addlen;
+
+  dstptr = dst + (dstlen - 1);
+  addptr = add + (addlen - 1);
+  while (len)
+    {
+      remainder += *dstptr + *addptr;
+      *dstptr = remainder & 0xff;
+      remainder >>= 8;
+      len--;
+      dstptr--;
+      addptr--;
+    }
+  len = dstlen - addlen;
+  while (len && remainder > 0)
+    {
+      remainder = *dstptr + 1;
+      *dstptr = remainder & 0xff;
+      remainder >>= 8;
+      len--;
+      dstptr--;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Helper variables for read_cb().
+ *
+ *   The _gcry_rnd*_gather_random interface does not allow to provide a
+ *   data pointer.  Thus we need to use a global variable for
+ *   communication.  However, the then required locking is anyway a good
+ *   idea because it does not make sense to have several readers of (say
+ *   /dev/random).  It is easier to serve them one after the other.
+ */
+static unsigned char *read_cb_buffer;	/* The buffer.  */
+static size_t read_cb_size;	        /* Size of the buffer.  */
+static size_t read_cb_len;	        /* Used length.  */
+
+/* Callback for generating seed from kernel device. */
+static void
+drbg_read_cb (const void *buffer, size_t length,
+              enum random_origins origin)
+{
+  const unsigned char *p = buffer;
+
+  (void) origin;
+  gcry_assert (read_cb_buffer);
+
+  /* Note that we need to protect against gatherers returning more
+   * than the requested bytes (e.g. rndw32).  */
+  while (length-- && read_cb_len < read_cb_size)
+    read_cb_buffer[read_cb_len++] = *p++;
+}
+
+static inline int
+drbg_get_entropy (drbg_state_t drbg, unsigned char *buffer,
+		       size_t len)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+
+  /* Perform testing as defined in 11.3.2 */
+  if (drbg->test_data && drbg->test_data->fail_seed_source)
+    return -1;
+
+  read_cb_buffer = buffer;
+  read_cb_size = len;
+  read_cb_len = 0;
+#if USE_RNDLINUX
+  rc = _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (drbg_read_cb, 0, len,
+				     GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+#elif USE_RNDUNIX
+  rc = _gcry_rndunix_gather_random (drbg_read_cb, 0, len,
+				    GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+#elif USE_RNDW32
+  do
+    {
+      rc = _gcry_rndw32_gather_random (drbg_read_cb, 0, len,
+				       GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+    }
+  while (rc >= 0 && read_cb_len < read_cb_size);
+#else
+  rc = -1;
+#endif
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * CTR DRBG callback functions
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+/* BCC function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.3 */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_ctr_bcc (drbg_state_t drbg,
+              unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key,
+              drbg_string_t *in)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+  drbg_string_t *curr = in;
+  size_t inpos = curr->len;
+  const unsigned char *pos = curr->buf;
+  drbg_string_t data;
+
+  drbg_string_fill (&data, out, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+
+  /* 10.4.3 step 1 */
+  memset (out, 0, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+
+  ret = drbg_sym_setkey(drbg, key);
+  if (ret)
+    return ret;
+
+  /* 10.4.3 step 2 / 4 */
+  while (inpos)
+    {
+      short cnt = 0;
+      /* 10.4.3 step 4.1 */
+      for (cnt = 0; cnt < drbg_blocklen (drbg); cnt++)
+	{
+	  out[cnt] ^= *pos;
+	  pos++;
+	  inpos--;
+	  /* the following branch implements the linked list
+	   * iteration. If we are at the end of the current data
+	   * set, we have to start using the next data set if
+	   * available -- the inpos value always points to the
+	   * current byte and will be zero if we have processed
+	   * the last byte of the last linked list member */
+	  if (0 == inpos)
+	    {
+	      curr = curr->next;
+	      if (NULL != curr)
+		{
+		  pos = curr->buf;
+		  inpos = curr->len;
+		}
+	      else
+		{
+		  inpos = 0;
+		  break;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+      /* 10.4.3 step 4.2 */
+      ret = drbg_sym (drbg, out, &data);
+      if (ret)
+	return ret;
+      /* 10.4.3 step 2 */
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * scratchpad usage: drbg_ctr_update is interlinked with drbg_ctr_df
+ * (and drbg_ctr_bcc, but this function does not need any temporary buffers),
+ * the scratchpad is used as follows:
+ * drbg_ctr_update:
+ *	temp
+ *		start: drbg->scratchpad
+ *		length: drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ *			note: the cipher writing into this variable works
+ *			blocklen-wise. Now, when the statelen is not a multiple
+ *			of blocklen, the generateion loop below "spills over"
+ *			by at most blocklen. Thus, we need to give sufficient
+ *			memory.
+ *	df_data
+ *		start: drbg->scratchpad +
+ *				drbg_statelen(drbg) +
+ *				drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ *		length: drbg_statelen(drbg)
+ *
+ * drbg_ctr_df:
+ *	pad
+ *		start: df_data + drbg_statelen(drbg)
+ *		length: drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ *	iv
+ *		start: pad + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ *		length: drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ *	temp
+ *		start: iv + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ *		length: drbg_satelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ *			note: temp is the buffer that the BCC function operates
+ *			on. BCC operates blockwise. drbg_statelen(drbg)
+ *			is sufficient when the DRBG state length is a multiple
+ *			of the block size. For AES192 (and maybe other ciphers)
+ *			this is not correct and the length for temp is
+ *			insufficient (yes, that also means for such ciphers,
+ *			the final output of all BCC rounds are truncated).
+ *			Therefore, add drbg_blocklen(drbg) to cover all
+ *			possibilities.
+ */
+
+/* Derivation Function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.2 */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_ctr_df (drbg_state_t drbg, unsigned char *df_data,
+             size_t bytes_to_return, drbg_string_t *addtl)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+  unsigned char L_N[8];
+  /* S3 is input */
+  drbg_string_t S1, S2, S4, cipherin;
+  drbg_string_t *tempstr = addtl;
+  unsigned char *pad = df_data + drbg_statelen (drbg);
+  unsigned char *iv = pad + drbg_blocklen (drbg);
+  unsigned char *temp = iv + drbg_blocklen (drbg);
+  size_t padlen = 0;
+  unsigned int templen = 0;
+  /* 10.4.2 step 7 */
+  unsigned int i = 0;
+  /* 10.4.2 step 8 */
+  const unsigned char *K = (unsigned char *)
+    "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+    "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f";
+  unsigned char *X;
+  size_t generated_len = 0;
+  size_t inputlen = 0;
+
+  memset (pad, 0, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  memset (iv, 0, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  memset (temp, 0, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 1 is implicit as we work byte-wise */
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 2 */
+  if ((512 / 8) < bytes_to_return)
+    return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 2 -- calculate the entire length of all input data */
+  for (; NULL != tempstr; tempstr = tempstr->next)
+    inputlen += tempstr->len;
+  buf_put_be32 (&L_N[0], inputlen);
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 3 */
+  buf_put_be32 (&L_N[4], bytes_to_return);
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 5: length is size of L_N, input_string, one byte, padding */
+  padlen = (inputlen + sizeof (L_N) + 1) % (drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  /* wrap the padlen appropriately */
+  if (padlen)
+    padlen = drbg_blocklen (drbg) - padlen;
+  /* pad / padlen contains the 0x80 byte and the following zero bytes, so
+   * add one for byte for 0x80 */
+  padlen++;
+  pad[0] = 0x80;
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 4 -- first fill the linked list and then order it */
+  drbg_string_fill (&S1, iv, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  drbg_string_fill (&S2, L_N, sizeof (L_N));
+  drbg_string_fill (&S4, pad, padlen);
+  S1.next = &S2;
+  S2.next = addtl;
+
+  /* Splice in addtl between S2 and S4 -- we place S4 at the end of the
+   * input data chain. As this code is only triggered when addtl is not
+   * NULL, no NULL checks are necessary.*/
+  tempstr = addtl;
+  while (tempstr->next)
+    tempstr = tempstr->next;
+  tempstr->next = &S4;
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 9 */
+  while (templen < (drbg_keylen (drbg) + (drbg_blocklen (drbg))))
+    {
+      /* 10.4.2 step 9.1 - the padding is implicit as the buffer
+       * holds zeros after allocation -- even the increment of i
+       * is irrelevant as the increment remains within length of i */
+      buf_put_be32 (iv, i);
+      /* 10.4.2 step 9.2 -- BCC and concatenation with temp */
+      ret = drbg_ctr_bcc (drbg, temp + templen, K, &S1);
+      if (ret)
+	goto out;
+      /* 10.4.2 step 9.3 */
+      i++;
+      templen += drbg_blocklen (drbg);
+    }
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 11 */
+  /* implicit key len with seedlen - blocklen according to table 3 */
+  X = temp + (drbg_keylen (drbg));
+  drbg_string_fill (&cipherin, X, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 12: overwriting of outval */
+
+  /* 10.4.2 step 13 */
+  ret = drbg_sym_setkey(drbg, temp);
+  if (ret)
+    goto out;
+  while (generated_len < bytes_to_return)
+    {
+      short blocklen = 0;
+      /* 10.4.2 step 13.1 */
+      /* the truncation of the key length is implicit as the key
+       * is only drbg_blocklen in size -- check for the implementation
+       * of the cipher function callback */
+      ret = drbg_sym (drbg, X, &cipherin);
+      if (ret)
+	goto out;
+      blocklen = (drbg_blocklen (drbg) < (bytes_to_return - generated_len)) ?
+	drbg_blocklen (drbg) : (bytes_to_return - generated_len);
+      /* 10.4.2 step 13.2 and 14 */
+      memcpy (df_data + generated_len, X, blocklen);
+      generated_len += blocklen;
+    }
+
+  ret = 0;
+
+ out:
+  memset (iv, 0, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  memset (temp, 0, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  memset (pad, 0, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update function of CTR DRBG as defined in 10.2.1.2
+ *
+ * The reseed variable has an enhanced meaning compared to the update
+ * functions of the other DRBGs as follows:
+ * 0 => initial seed from initialization
+ * 1 => reseed via drbg_seed
+ * 2 => first invocation from drbg_ctr_update when addtl is present. In
+ *      this case, the df_data scratchpad is not deleted so that it is
+ *      available for another calls to prevent calling the DF function
+ *      again.
+ * 3 => second invocation from drbg_ctr_update. When the update function
+ *      was called with addtl, the df_data memory already contains the
+ *      DFed addtl information and we do not need to call DF again.
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_ctr_update (drbg_state_t drbg, drbg_string_t *addtl, int reseed)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+  /* 10.2.1.2 step 1 */
+  unsigned char *temp = drbg->scratchpad;
+  unsigned char *df_data = drbg->scratchpad +
+    drbg_statelen (drbg) + drbg_blocklen (drbg);
+  unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
+
+  memset (temp, 0, drbg_statelen (drbg) + drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  if (3 > reseed)
+    memset (df_data, 0, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+
+  if (!reseed)
+    {
+      /*
+       * The DRBG uses the CTR mode of the underlying AES cipher. The
+       * CTR mode increments the counter value after the AES operation
+       * but SP800-90A requires that the counter is incremented before
+       * the AES operation. Hence, we increment it at the time we set
+       * it by one.
+       */
+      drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, drbg_blocklen (drbg), &prefix, 1);
+
+      ret = _gcry_cipher_setkey (drbg->ctr_handle, drbg->C, drbg_keylen (drbg));
+      if (ret)
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+  /* 10.2.1.3.2 step 2 and 10.2.1.4.2 step 2 */
+  if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
+    {
+      ret =
+	drbg_ctr_df (drbg, df_data, drbg_statelen (drbg), addtl);
+      if (ret)
+	goto out;
+    }
+
+  ret = drbg_sym_ctr (drbg, df_data, drbg_statelen(drbg),
+		      temp, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+  if (ret)
+    goto out;
+
+  /* 10.2.1.2 step 5 */
+  ret = _gcry_cipher_setkey (drbg->ctr_handle, temp, drbg_keylen (drbg));
+  if (ret)
+    goto out;
+
+  /* 10.2.1.2 step 6 */
+  memcpy (drbg->V, temp + drbg_keylen (drbg), drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  /* See above: increment counter by one to compensate timing of CTR op */
+  drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, drbg_blocklen (drbg), &prefix, 1);
+  ret = 0;
+
+ out:
+  memset (temp, 0, drbg_statelen (drbg) + drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  if (2 != reseed)
+    memset (df_data, 0, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * scratchpad use: drbg_ctr_update is called independently from
+ * drbg_ctr_extract_bytes. Therefore, the scratchpad is reused
+ */
+/* Generate function of CTR DRBG as defined in 10.2.1.5.2 */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_ctr_generate (drbg_state_t drbg,
+                   unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+                   drbg_string_t *addtl)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = 0;
+
+  memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+
+  /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 2 */
+  if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
+    {
+      addtl->next = NULL;
+      ret = drbg_ctr_update (drbg, addtl, 2);
+      if (ret)
+	return ret;
+    }
+
+  /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 4.1 */
+  ret = drbg_sym_ctr (drbg, drbg->ctr_null, DRBG_CTR_NULL_LEN, buf, buflen);
+  if (ret)
+    goto out;
+
+  /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 6 */
+  if (addtl)
+    addtl->next = NULL;
+  ret = drbg_ctr_update (drbg, addtl, 3);
+
+ out:
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static struct drbg_state_ops_s drbg_ctr_ops = {
+  drbg_ctr_update,
+  drbg_ctr_generate,
+  drbg_sym_init,
+  drbg_sym_fini,
+};
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * HMAC DRBG callback functions
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hmac_update (drbg_state_t drbg, drbg_string_t *seed, int reseed)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+  int i = 0;
+  drbg_string_t seed1, seed2, cipherin;
+
+  if (!reseed)
+    {
+      /* 10.1.2.3 step 2 already implicitly covered with
+       * the initial memset(0) of drbg->C */
+      memset (drbg->V, 1, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+      ret = drbg_hmac_setkey (drbg, drbg->C);
+      if (ret)
+	return ret;
+    }
+
+  /* build linked list which implements the concatenation and fill
+   * first part*/
+  drbg_string_fill (&seed1, drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  /* buffer will be filled in for loop below with one byte */
+  drbg_string_fill (&seed2, NULL, 1);
+  seed1.next = &seed2;
+  /* seed may be NULL */
+  seed2.next = seed;
+
+  drbg_string_fill (&cipherin, drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  /* we execute two rounds of V/K massaging */
+  for (i = 2; 0 < i; i--)
+    {
+      byte *retval;
+      /* first round uses 0x0, second 0x1 */
+      unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX0;
+      if (1 == i)
+	prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
+      /* 10.1.2.2 step 1 and 4 -- concatenation and HMAC for key */
+      seed2.buf = &prefix;
+      retval = drbg_hash (drbg, &seed1);
+      ret = drbg_hmac_setkey (drbg, retval);
+      if (ret)
+	return ret;
+
+      /* 10.1.2.2 step 2 and 5 -- HMAC for V */
+      retval = drbg_hash (drbg, &cipherin);
+      memcpy(drbg->V, retval, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+
+      /* 10.1.2.2 step 3 */
+      if (!seed || 0 == seed->len)
+	return ret;
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* generate function of HMAC DRBG as defined in 10.1.2.5 */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hmac_generate (drbg_state_t drbg, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+                    drbg_string_t *addtl)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = 0;
+  unsigned int len = 0;
+  drbg_string_t data;
+
+  /* 10.1.2.5 step 2 */
+  if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
+    {
+      addtl->next = NULL;
+      ret = drbg_hmac_update (drbg, addtl, 1);
+      if (ret)
+	return ret;
+    }
+
+  drbg_string_fill (&data, drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  while (len < buflen)
+    {
+      unsigned int outlen = 0;
+      /* 10.1.2.5 step 4.1 */
+      byte *retval = drbg_hash (drbg, &data);
+      memcpy(drbg->V, retval, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+      outlen = (drbg_blocklen (drbg) < (buflen - len)) ?
+	drbg_blocklen (drbg) : (buflen - len);
+
+      /* 10.1.2.5 step 4.2 */
+      memcpy (buf + len, drbg->V, outlen);
+      len += outlen;
+    }
+
+  /* 10.1.2.5 step 6 */
+  if (addtl)
+    addtl->next = NULL;
+  ret = drbg_hmac_update (drbg, addtl, 1);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static struct drbg_state_ops_s drbg_hmac_ops = {
+  drbg_hmac_update,
+  drbg_hmac_generate,
+  drbg_hmac_init,
+  drbg_hash_fini,
+};
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * Hash DRBG callback functions
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * scratchpad usage: as drbg_hash_update and drbg_hash_df are used
+ * interlinked, the scratchpad is used as follows:
+ * drbg_hash_update
+ *	start: drbg->scratchpad
+ *	length: drbg_statelen(drbg)
+ * drbg_hash_df:
+ *	start: drbg->scratchpad + drbg_statelen(drbg)
+ *	length: drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ */
+/* Derivation Function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.4.1 */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hash_df (drbg_state_t drbg,
+              unsigned char *outval, size_t outlen,
+              drbg_string_t *entropy)
+{
+  size_t len = 0;
+  unsigned char input[5];
+  drbg_string_t data1;
+
+  /* 10.4.1 step 3 */
+  input[0] = 1;
+  buf_put_be32 (&input[1], (outlen * 8));
+
+  /* 10.4.1 step 4.1 -- concatenation of data for input into hash */
+  drbg_string_fill (&data1, input, 5);
+  data1.next = entropy;
+
+  /* 10.4.1 step 4 */
+  while (len < outlen)
+    {
+      short blocklen = 0;
+      /* 10.4.1 step 4.1 */
+      byte *retval = drbg_hash (drbg, &data1);
+      /* 10.4.1 step 4.2 */
+      input[0]++;
+      blocklen = (drbg_blocklen (drbg) < (outlen - len)) ?
+	drbg_blocklen (drbg) : (outlen - len);
+      memcpy (outval + len, retval, blocklen);
+      len += blocklen;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* update function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hash_update (drbg_state_t drbg, drbg_string_t *seed, int reseed)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = 0;
+  drbg_string_t data1, data2;
+  unsigned char *V = drbg->scratchpad;
+  unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
+
+  memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  if (!seed)
+    return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+  if (reseed)
+    {
+      /* 10.1.1.3 step 1: string length is concatenation of
+       * 1 byte, V and seed (which is concatenated entropy/addtl
+       * input)
+       */
+      memcpy (V, drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+      drbg_string_fill (&data1, &prefix, 1);
+      drbg_string_fill (&data2, V, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+      data1.next = &data2;
+      data2.next = seed;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      drbg_string_fill (&data1, seed->buf, seed->len);
+      data1.next = seed->next;
+    }
+
+  /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 2 and 3 */
+  ret = drbg_hash_df (drbg, drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg), &data1);
+  if (ret)
+    goto out;
+
+  /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 4 -- concatenation  */
+  prefix = DRBG_PREFIX0;
+  drbg_string_fill (&data1, &prefix, 1);
+  drbg_string_fill (&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  data1.next = &data2;
+  /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 4 -- df operation */
+  ret = drbg_hash_df (drbg, drbg->C, drbg_statelen (drbg), &data1);
+
+ out:
+  memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Processing of additional information string for Hash DRBG.  */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hash_process_addtl (drbg_state_t drbg, drbg_string_t *addtl)
+{
+  drbg_string_t data1, data2;
+  drbg_string_t *data3;
+  unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX2;
+  byte *retval;
+
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step 2 */
+  if (!addtl || 0 == addtl->len)
+    return 0;
+
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step 2a -- concatenation */
+  drbg_string_fill (&data1, &prefix, 1);
+  drbg_string_fill (&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  data3 = addtl;
+  data1.next = &data2;
+  data2.next = data3;
+  data3->next = NULL;
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step 2a -- cipher invocation */
+  retval = drbg_hash (drbg, &data1);
+
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step 2b */
+  drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg), retval, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hashgen defined in 10.1.1.4
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hash_hashgen (drbg_state_t drbg, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen)
+{
+  unsigned int len = 0;
+  unsigned char *src = drbg->scratchpad;
+  drbg_string_t data;
+  unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
+
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 2 */
+  memcpy (src, drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+
+  drbg_string_fill (&data, src, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  while (len < buflen)
+    {
+      unsigned int outlen = 0;
+      /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 4.1 */
+      byte *retval = drbg_hash (drbg, &data);
+      outlen = (drbg_blocklen (drbg) < (buflen - len)) ?
+	drbg_blocklen (drbg) : (buflen - len);
+      /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 4.2 */
+      memcpy (buf + len, retval, outlen);
+      len += outlen;
+      /* 10.1.1.4 hashgen step 4.3 */
+      if (len < buflen)
+	drbg_add_buf (src, drbg_statelen (drbg), &prefix, 1);
+    }
+
+  memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Generate function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.1.1.4  */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hash_generate (drbg_state_t drbg, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+		    drbg_string_t *addtl)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret;
+  unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX3;
+  drbg_string_t data1, data2;
+  byte *retval;
+  union
+  {
+    unsigned char req[8];
+    u64 req_int;
+  } u;
+
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step 2 */
+  ret = drbg_hash_process_addtl (drbg, addtl);
+  if (ret)
+    return ret;
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step 3 -- invocation of the Hashgen function defined in
+   * 10.1.1.4 */
+  ret = drbg_hash_hashgen (drbg, buf, buflen);
+  if (ret)
+    return ret;
+
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step 4 */
+  drbg_string_fill (&data1, &prefix, 1);
+  drbg_string_fill (&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  data1.next = &data2;
+
+  /* this is the value H as documented in 10.1.1.4 */
+  retval = drbg_hash (drbg, &data1);
+
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step 5 */
+  drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg), retval, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg), drbg->C, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  u.req_int = be_bswap64 (drbg->reseed_ctr);
+  drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, drbg_statelen (drbg), u.req, sizeof (u.req));
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * scratchpad usage: as update and generate are used isolated, both
+ * can use the scratchpad
+ */
+static struct drbg_state_ops_s drbg_hash_ops = {
+  drbg_hash_update,
+  drbg_hash_generate,
+  drbg_hash_init,
+  drbg_hash_fini,
+};
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * Functions common for DRBG implementations
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Seeding or reseeding of the DRBG
+ *
+ * @drbg: DRBG state struct
+ * @pers: personalization / additional information buffer
+ * @reseed: 0 for initial seed process, 1 for reseeding
+ *
+ * return:
+ *	0 on success
+ *	error value otherwise
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_seed (drbg_state_t drbg, drbg_string_t *pers, int reseed)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = 0;
+  unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
+  size_t entropylen = 0;
+  drbg_string_t data1;
+
+  /* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */
+  if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl ()))
+    {
+      dbg (("DRBG: personalization string too long %lu\n", pers->len));
+      return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+    }
+  if (drbg->test_data && drbg->test_data->testentropy)
+    {
+      drbg_string_fill (&data1, drbg->test_data->testentropy->buf,
+			     drbg->test_data->testentropy->len);
+      dbg (("DRBG: using test entropy\n"));
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* Gather entropy equal to the security strength of the DRBG.
+       * With a derivation function, a nonce is required in addition
+       * to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security
+       * strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy * nonce is 3/2
+       * of the strength. The consideration of a nonce is only
+       * applicable during initial seeding. */
+      entropylen = drbg_sec_strength (drbg->core->flags);
+      if (!entropylen)
+	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+      if (0 == reseed)
+	/* make sure we round up strength/2 in
+	 * case it is not divisible by 2 */
+	entropylen = ((entropylen + 1) / 2) * 3;
+      dbg (("DRBG: (re)seeding with %lu bytes of entropy\n", entropylen));
+      entropy = xcalloc_secure (1, entropylen);
+      if (!entropy)
+	return GPG_ERR_ENOMEM;
+      ret = drbg_get_entropy (drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+      if (ret)
+	goto out;
+      drbg_string_fill (&data1, entropy, entropylen);
+    }
+
+  /* concatenation of entropy with personalization str / addtl input)
+   * the variable pers is directly handed by the caller, check its
+   * contents whether it is appropriate */
+  if (pers && pers->buf && 0 < pers->len && NULL == pers->next)
+    {
+      data1.next = pers;
+      dbg (("DRBG: using personalization string\n"));
+    }
+
+  ret = drbg->d_ops->update (drbg, &data1, reseed);
+  dbg (("DRBG: state updated with seed\n"));
+  if (ret)
+    goto out;
+  drbg->seeded = 1;
+  /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
+  drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
+
+ out:
+  xfree (entropy);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*************************************************************************
+ * Exported interfaces.
+ *************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * DRBG generate function as required by SP800-90A - this function
+ * generates random numbers
+ *
+ * @drbg   DRBG state handle
+ * @buf    Buffer where to store the random numbers -- the buffer must already
+ *         be pre-allocated by caller
+ * @buflen Length of output buffer - this value defines the number of random
+ *	   bytes pulled from DRBG
+ * @addtl  Additional input that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note
+ *	   the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally
+ *	   as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into
+ *	   the state in addition to the pulled entropy.
+ *
+ * return: Generated number of bytes.
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_generate (drbg_state_t drbg,
+               unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+               drbg_string_t *addtl)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+  if (0 == buflen || !buf)
+    {
+      dbg (("DRBG: no buffer provided\n"));
+      return ret;
+    }
+  if (addtl && NULL == addtl->buf && 0 < addtl->len)
+    {
+      dbg (("DRBG: wrong format of additional information\n"));
+      return ret;
+    }
+
+  /* 9.3.1 step 2 */
+  if (buflen > (drbg_max_request_bytes ()))
+    {
+      dbg (("DRBG: requested random numbers too large %u\n", buflen));
+      return ret;
+    }
+  /* 9.3.1 step 3 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */
+  /* 9.3.1 step 4 */
+  if (addtl && addtl->len > (drbg_max_addtl ()))
+    {
+      dbg (("DRBG: additional information string too long %lu\n",
+	    addtl->len));
+      return ret;
+    }
+  /* 9.3.1 step 5 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */
+  /* 9.3.1 step 6 and 9 supplemented by 9.3.2 step c -- the spec is a
+   * bit convoluted here, we make it simpler */
+  if ((drbg_max_requests ()) < drbg->reseed_ctr)
+    drbg->seeded = 0;
+
+  if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded)
+    {
+      dbg (("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction resistance: %s, state %s)\n", drbg->pr ? "true" : "false", drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded"));
+      /* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */
+      ret = drbg_seed (drbg, addtl, 1);
+      if (ret)
+	return ret;
+      /* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */
+      addtl = NULL;
+    }
+
+  if (addtl && addtl->buf)
+    {
+      dbg (("DRBG: using additional information string\n"));
+    }
+
+  /* 9.3.1 step 8 and 10 */
+  ret = drbg->d_ops->generate (drbg, buf, buflen, addtl);
+
+  /* 10.1.1.4 step 6, 10.1.2.5 step 7, 10.2.1.5.2 step 7 */
+  drbg->reseed_ctr++;
+  if (ret)
+    return ret;
+
+  /* 11.3.3 -- re-perform self tests after some generated random
+   * numbers, the chosen value after which self test is performed
+   * is arbitrary, but it should be reasonable */
+  /* Here we do not perform the self tests because of the following
+   * reasons: it is mathematically impossible that the initial self tests
+   * were successfully and the following are not. If the initial would
+   * pass and the following would not, the system integrity is violated.
+   * In this case, the entire system operation is questionable and it
+   * is unlikely that the integrity violation only affects to the
+   * correct operation of the DRBG.
+   */
+#if 0
+  if (drbg->reseed_ctr && !(drbg->reseed_ctr % 4096))
+    {
+      dbg (("DRBG: start to perform self test\n"));
+      ret = drbg_healthcheck ();
+      if (ret)
+	{
+	  log_fatal (("DRBG: self test failed\n"));
+	  return ret;
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  dbg (("DRBG: self test successful\n"));
+	}
+    }
+#endif
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper around drbg_generate which can pull arbitrary long strings
+ * from the DRBG without hitting the maximum request limitation.
+ *
+ * Parameters: see drbg_generate
+ * Return codes: see drbg_generate -- if one drbg_generate request fails,
+ *		 the entire drbg_generate_long request fails
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_generate_long (drbg_state_t drbg,
+                    unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+                    drbg_string_t *addtl)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = 0;
+  unsigned int slice = 0;
+  unsigned char *buf_p = buf;
+  unsigned len = 0;
+  do
+    {
+      unsigned int chunk = 0;
+      slice = ((buflen - len) / drbg_max_request_bytes ());
+      chunk = slice ? drbg_max_request_bytes () : (buflen - len);
+      ret = drbg_generate (drbg, buf_p, chunk, addtl);
+      if (ret)
+	return ret;
+      buf_p += chunk;
+      len += chunk;
+    }
+  while (slice > 0 && (len < buflen));
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DRBG uninstantiate function as required by SP800-90A - this function
+ * frees all buffers and the DRBG handle
+ *
+ * @drbg DRBG state handle
+ *
+ * return
+ * 	0 on success
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_uninstantiate (drbg_state_t drbg)
+{
+  if (!drbg)
+    return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+  drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
+  xfree (drbg->V);
+  drbg->V = NULL;
+  xfree (drbg->C);
+  drbg->C = NULL;
+  drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
+  xfree (drbg->scratchpad);
+  drbg->scratchpad = NULL;
+  drbg->seeded = 0;
+  drbg->pr = 0;
+  drbg->seed_init_pid = 0;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DRBG instantiation function as required by SP800-90A - this function
+ * sets up the DRBG handle, performs the initial seeding and all sanity
+ * checks required by SP800-90A
+ *
+ * @drbg memory of state -- if NULL, new memory is allocated
+ * @pers Personalization string that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note
+ *	 the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally
+ *	 as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into
+ *	 the state in addition to the pulled entropy.
+ * @coreref reference to core
+ * @flags Flags defining the requested DRBG type and cipher type. The flags
+ * 	  are defined in drbg.h and may be XORed. Beware, if you XOR multiple
+ * 	  cipher types together, the code picks the core on a first come first
+ * 	  serve basis as it iterates through the available cipher cores and
+ * 	  uses the one with the first match. The minimum required flags are:
+ * 		cipher type flag
+ *
+ * return
+ *	0 on success
+ *	error value otherwise
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_instantiate (drbg_state_t drbg,
+                  drbg_string_t *pers, int coreref, int pr)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_ENOMEM;
+  unsigned int sb_size = 0;
+
+  if (!drbg)
+    return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+  dbg (("DRBG: Initializing DRBG core %d with prediction resistance %s\n",
+	coreref, pr ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
+  drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
+  drbg->pr = pr;
+  drbg->seeded = 0;
+  if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC)
+    drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hmac_ops;
+  else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HASH_MASK)
+    drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hash_ops;
+  else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_CTR_MASK)
+    drbg->d_ops = &drbg_ctr_ops;
+  else
+    return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+  /* 9.1 step 1 is implicit with the selected DRBG type -- see
+   * drbg_sec_strength() */
+
+  /* 9.1 step 2 is implicit as caller can select prediction resistance
+   * and the flag is copied into drbg->flags --
+   * all DRBG types support prediction resistance */
+
+  /* 9.1 step 4 is implicit in  drbg_sec_strength */
+
+  ret = drbg->d_ops->crypto_init(drbg);
+  if (ret)
+    goto err;
+
+  drbg->V = xcalloc_secure (1, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  if (!drbg->V)
+    goto fini;
+  drbg->C = xcalloc_secure (1, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+  if (!drbg->C)
+    goto fini;
+  /* scratchpad is only generated for CTR and Hash */
+  if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC)
+    sb_size = 0;
+  else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_CTR_MASK)
+    sb_size = drbg_statelen (drbg) + drbg_blocklen (drbg) +	/* temp */
+      drbg_statelen (drbg) +	/* df_data */
+      drbg_blocklen (drbg) +	/* pad */
+      drbg_blocklen (drbg) +	/* iv */
+      drbg_statelen (drbg) + drbg_blocklen (drbg);	/* temp */
+  else
+    sb_size = drbg_statelen (drbg);
+
+  if (0 < sb_size)
+    {
+      drbg->scratchpad = xcalloc_secure (1, sb_size);
+      if (!drbg->scratchpad)
+	goto fini;
+    }
+  dbg (("DRBG: state allocated with scratchpad size %u bytes\n", sb_size));
+
+  /* 9.1 step 6 through 11 */
+  ret = drbg_seed (drbg, pers, 0);
+  if (ret)
+    goto fini;
+
+  dbg (("DRBG: core %d %s prediction resistance successfully initialized\n",
+	coreref, pr ? "with" : "without"));
+  return 0;
+
+ fini:
+  drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
+ err:
+  drbg_uninstantiate (drbg);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DRBG reseed function as required by SP800-90A
+ *
+ * @drbg DRBG state handle
+ * @addtl Additional input that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note
+ * 		the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally
+ * 		as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into
+ * 		the state in addition to the pulled entropy.
+ *
+ * return
+ * 	0 on success
+ * 	error value otherwise
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_reseed (drbg_state_t drbg,drbg_string_t *addtl)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = 0;
+  ret = drbg_seed (drbg, addtl, 1);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * Libgcrypt integration code.
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+/***************************************************
+ * Libgcrypt backend functions to the RNG API code.
+ ***************************************************/
+
+static inline void
+drbg_lock (void)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ec;
+
+  ec = gpgrt_lock_lock (&drbg_lock_var);
+  if (ec)
+    log_fatal ("failed to acquire the RNG lock: %s\n", gpg_strerror (ec));
+}
+
+static inline void
+drbg_unlock (void)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ec;
+
+  ec = gpgrt_lock_unlock (&drbg_lock_var);
+  if (ec)
+    log_fatal ("failed to release the RNG lock: %s\n", gpg_strerror (ec));
+}
+
+/* Basic initialization is required to initialize mutexes and
+   do a few checks on the implementation.  */
+static void
+basic_initialization (void)
+{
+  static int initialized;
+
+  if (initialized)
+    return;
+  initialized = 1;
+
+  /* Make sure that we are still using the values we have
+     traditionally used for the random levels.  */
+  gcry_assert (GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM == 0
+               && GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM == 1
+               && GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM == 2);
+}
+
+/****** helper functions where lock must be held by caller *****/
+
+/* Check whether given flags are known to point to an applicable DRBG */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_algo_available (u32 flags, int *coreref)
+{
+  int i = 0;
+  for (i = 0; ARRAY_SIZE (drbg_cores) > i; i++)
+    {
+      if ((drbg_cores[i].flags & DRBG_CIPHER_MASK) ==
+	  (flags & DRBG_CIPHER_MASK))
+	{
+	  *coreref = i;
+	  return 0;
+	}
+    }
+  return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+}
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+_drbg_init_internal (u32 flags, drbg_string_t *pers)
+{
+  static u32 oldflags;
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = 0;
+  int coreref = 0;
+  int pr = 0;
+
+  /* If a caller provides 0 as flags, use the flags of the previous
+   * initialization, otherwise use the current flags and remember them
+   * for the next invocation.  If no flag is given and no global state
+   * is set this is the first initialization and we set the default
+   * type.
+   */
+  if (!flags && !drbg_state)
+    flags = oldflags = DRBG_DEFAULT_TYPE;
+  else if (!flags)
+    flags = oldflags;
+  else
+    oldflags = flags;
+
+  ret = drbg_algo_available (flags, &coreref);
+  if (ret)
+    return ret;
+
+  if (drbg_state)
+    {
+      drbg_uninstantiate (drbg_state);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      drbg_state = xtrycalloc_secure (1, sizeof *drbg_state);
+      if (!drbg_state)
+	return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+    }
+  if (flags & DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST)
+    pr = 1;
+  ret = drbg_instantiate (drbg_state, pers, coreref, pr);
+  if (ret)
+    fips_signal_error ("DRBG cannot be initialized");
+  else
+    drbg_state->seed_init_pid = getpid ();
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/************* calls available to common RNG code **************/
+
+/*
+ * Initialize one DRBG invoked by the libgcrypt API
+ */
+void
+_gcry_rngdrbg_inititialize (int full)
+{
+  basic_initialization ();
+  if (!full)
+      return;
+  drbg_lock ();
+  if (!drbg_state)
+    _drbg_init_internal (0, NULL);
+  drbg_unlock ();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Backend handler function for GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT
+ *
+ * Select a different DRBG type and initialize it.
+ * Function checks whether requested DRBG type exists and returns an error in
+ * case it does not. In case of an error, the previous instantiated DRBG is
+ * left untouched and alive. Thus, in case of an error, a DRBG is always
+ * available, even if it is not the chosen one.
+ *
+ * Re-initialization will be performed in any case regardless whether flags
+ * or personalization string are set.
+ *
+ * If flags is NULL, do not change current DRBG.  If PERS is NULL and
+ * NPERS is 0, re-initialize without personalization string.  If PERS
+ * is not NULL NPERS must be one and PERS and the first ietm from the
+ * bufer is take as personalization string.
+ */
+gpg_err_code_t
+_gcry_rngdrbg_reinit (const char *flagstr, gcry_buffer_t *pers, int npers)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret;
+  unsigned int flags;
+
+  /* If PERS is not given we expect NPERS to be zero; if given we
+     expect a one-item array.  */
+  if ((!pers && npers) || (pers && npers != 1))
+    return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+  ret = parse_flag_string (flagstr, &flags);
+  if (!ret)
+    {
+      dbg (("DRBG: reinitialize internal DRBG state with flags %u\n", flags));
+      drbg_lock ();
+      if (pers)
+        {
+          drbg_string_t persbuf;
+
+          drbg_string_fill
+            (&persbuf, (const unsigned char *)pers[0].data + pers[0].off,
+             pers[0].len);
+          ret = _drbg_init_internal (flags, &persbuf);
+        }
+      else
+        ret = _drbg_init_internal (flags, NULL);
+      drbg_unlock ();
+    }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Try to close the FDs of the random gather module.  This is
+ * currently only implemented for rndlinux. */
+void
+_gcry_rngdrbg_close_fds (void)
+{
+#if USE_RNDLINUX
+  drbg_lock ();
+  _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+  drbg_unlock ();
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Print some statistics about the RNG.  */
+void
+_gcry_rngdrbg_dump_stats (void)
+{
+  /* Not yet implemented.  */
+  /* Maybe dumping of reseed counter? */
+}
+
+/* This function returns true if no real RNG is available or the
+ * quality of the RNG has been degraded for test purposes.  */
+int
+_gcry_rngdrbg_is_faked (void)
+{
+  return 0;			/* Faked random is not allowed.  */
+}
+
+/* Add BUFLEN bytes from BUF to the internal random pool.  QUALITY
+ * should be in the range of 0..100 to indicate the goodness of the
+ * entropy added, or -1 for goodness not known. */
+gcry_error_t
+_gcry_rngdrbg_add_bytes (const void *buf, size_t buflen, int quality)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = 0;
+  drbg_string_t seed;
+  (void) quality;
+  _gcry_rngdrbg_inititialize (1); /* Auto-initialize if needed */
+  if (!drbg_state)
+    return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+  drbg_string_fill (&seed, (unsigned char *) buf, buflen);
+  drbg_lock ();
+  ret = drbg_reseed (drbg_state, &seed);
+  drbg_unlock ();
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* This function is to be used for all types of random numbers, including
+ * nonces
+ */
+void
+_gcry_rngdrbg_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length,
+		      enum gcry_random_level level)
+{
+  (void) level;
+  _gcry_rngdrbg_inititialize (1); /* Auto-initialize if needed */
+  drbg_lock ();
+  if (!drbg_state)
+    {
+      fips_signal_error ("DRBG is not initialized");
+      goto bailout;
+    }
+
+  /* As reseeding changes the entire state of the DRBG, including any
+   * key, either a re-init or a reseed is sufficient for a fork */
+  if (drbg_state->seed_init_pid != getpid ())
+    {
+      /* We are in a child of us. Perform a reseeding. */
+      if (drbg_reseed (drbg_state, NULL))
+	{
+	  fips_signal_error ("reseeding upon fork failed");
+	  log_fatal ("severe error getting random\n");
+	  goto bailout;
+	}
+    }
+  /* potential integer overflow is covered by drbg_generate which
+   * ensures that length cannot overflow an unsigned int */
+  if (0 < length)
+    {
+      if (!buffer)
+	goto bailout;
+      if (drbg_generate_long (drbg_state, buffer, (unsigned int) length, NULL))
+	log_fatal ("No random numbers generated\n");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      drbg_gen_t *data = (drbg_gen_t *)buffer;
+      /* catch NULL pointer */
+      if (!data || !data->outbuf)
+	{
+	  fips_signal_error ("No output buffer provided");
+	  goto bailout;
+	}
+      if (drbg_generate_long (drbg_state, data->outbuf, data->outlen,
+                              data->addtl))
+	log_fatal ("No random numbers generated\n");
+    }
+
+ bailout:
+  drbg_unlock ();
+  return;
+
+}
+
+/***************************************************************
+ * Self-test code
+ ***************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Test vectors from
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip
+ */
+struct gcry_drbg_test_vector drbg_test_pr[] = {
+  {
+    /* .flags = */ "sha256 pr" /* DRBG_PR_HASHSHA256 */,
+    /* .entropy = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x5d\xf2\x14\xbc\xf6\xb5\x4e\x0b\xf0\x0d\x6f\x2d"
+    "\xe2\x01\x66\x7b\xd0\xa4\x73\xa4\x21\xdd\xb0\xc0"
+    "\x51\x79\x09\xf4\xea\xa9\x08\xfa\xa6\x67\xe0\xe1"
+    "\xd1\x88\xa8\xad\xee\x69\x74\xb3\x55\x06\x9b\xf6",
+    /* .entropylen = */ 48,
+    /* .entpra = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xef\x48\x06\xa2\xc2\x45\xf1\x44\xfa\x34\x2c\xeb"
+    "\x8d\x78\x3c\x09\x8f\x34\x72\x20\xf2\xe7\xfd\x13"
+    "\x76\x0a\xf6\xdc\x3c\xf5\xc0\x15",
+    /* .entprb = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x4b\xbe\xe5\x24\xed\x6a\x2d\x0c\xdb\x73\x5e\x09"
+    "\xf9\xad\x67\x7c\x51\x47\x8b\x6b\x30\x2a\xc6\xde"
+    "\x76\xaa\x55\x04\x8b\x0a\x72\x95",
+    /* .entprlen = */ 32,
+    /* .addtla = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xbe\x13\xdb\x2a\xe9\xa8\xfe\x09\x97\xe1\xce\x5d"
+    "\xe8\xbb\xc0\x7c\x4f\xcb\x62\x19\x3f\x0f\xd2\xad"
+    "\xa9\xd0\x1d\x59\x02\xc4\xff\x70",
+    /* .addtlb = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x6f\x96\x13\xe2\xa7\xf5\x6c\xfe\xdf\x66\xe3\x31"
+    "\x63\x76\xbf\x20\x27\x06\x49\xf1\xf3\x01\x77\x41"
+    "\x9f\xeb\xe4\x38\xfe\x67\x00\xcd",
+    /* .addtllen = */ 32,
+    /* .pers = */ NULL,
+    /* .perslen = */ 0,
+    /* .expected = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x3b\x14\x71\x99\xa1\xda\xa0\x42\xe6\xc8\x85\x32"
+    "\x70\x20\x32\x53\x9a\xbe\xd1\x1e\x15\xef\xfb\x4c"
+    "\x25\x6e\x19\x3a\xf0\xb9\xcb\xde\xf0\x3b\xc6\x18"
+    "\x4d\x85\x5a\x9b\xf1\xe3\xc2\x23\x03\x93\x08\xdb"
+    "\xa7\x07\x4b\x33\x78\x40\x4d\xeb\x24\xf5\x6e\x81"
+    "\x4a\x1b\x6e\xa3\x94\x52\x43\xb0\xaf\x2e\x21\xf4"
+    "\x42\x46\x8e\x90\xed\x34\x21\x75\xea\xda\x67\xb6"
+    "\xe4\xf6\xff\xc6\x31\x6c\x9a\x5a\xdb\xb3\x97\x13"
+    "\x09\xd3\x20\x98\x33\x2d\x6d\xd7\xb5\x6a\xa8\xa9"
+    "\x9a\x5b\xd6\x87\x52\xa1\x89\x2b\x4b\x9c\x64\x60"
+    "\x50\x47\xa3\x63\x81\x16\xaf\x19",
+    /* .expectedlen = */ 128,
+    /* .entropyreseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .entropyreseed_len = */ 0,
+    /* .addtl_reseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtl_reseed_len = */ 0
+  },
+  {
+    /* flags = */ "hmac sha256 pr" /* DRBG_PR_HMACSHA256 */,
+    /* .entropy = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x13\x54\x96\xfc\x1b\x7d\x28\xf3\x18\xc9\xa7\x89"
+    "\xb6\xb3\xc8\x72\xac\x00\xd4\x59\x36\x25\x05\xaf"
+    "\xa5\xdb\x96\xcb\x3c\x58\x46\x87\xa5\xaa\xbf\x20"
+    "\x3b\xfe\x23\x0e\xd1\xc7\x41\x0f\x3f\xc9\xb3\x67",
+    /* .entropylen = */ 48,
+    /* .entpra = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xe2\xbd\xb7\x48\x08\x06\xf3\xe1\x93\x3c\xac\x79"
+    "\xa7\x2b\x11\xda\xe3\x2e\xe1\x91\xa5\x02\x19\x57"
+    "\x20\x28\xad\xf2\x60\xd7\xcd\x45",
+    /* .entprb = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x8b\xd4\x69\xfc\xff\x59\x95\x95\xc6\x51\xde\x71"
+    "\x68\x5f\xfc\xf9\x4a\xab\xec\x5a\xcb\xbe\xd3\x66"
+    "\x1f\xfa\x74\xd3\xac\xa6\x74\x60",
+    /* .entprlen = */ 32,
+    /* .addtla = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtlb = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtllen = */ 0,
+    /* .pers = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x64\xb6\xfc\x60\xbc\x61\x76\x23\x6d\x3f\x4a\x0f"
+    "\xe1\xb4\xd5\x20\x9e\x70\xdd\x03\x53\x6d\xbf\xce"
+    "\xcd\x56\x80\xbc\xb8\x15\xc8\xaa",
+    /* .perslen = */ 32,
+    /* .expected = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x1f\x9e\xaf\xe4\xd2\x46\xb7\x47\x41\x4c\x65\x99"
+    "\x01\xe9\x3b\xbb\x83\x0c\x0a\xb0\xc1\x3a\xe2\xb3"
+    "\x31\x4e\xeb\x93\x73\xee\x0b\x26\xc2\x63\xa5\x75"
+    "\x45\x99\xd4\x5c\x9f\xa1\xd4\x45\x87\x6b\x20\x61"
+    "\x40\xea\x78\xa5\x32\xdf\x9e\x66\x17\xaf\xb1\x88"
+    "\x9e\x2e\x23\xdd\xc1\xda\x13\x97\x88\xa5\xb6\x5e"
+    "\x90\x14\x4e\xef\x13\xab\x5c\xd9\x2c\x97\x9e\x7c"
+    "\xd7\xf8\xce\xea\x81\xf5\xcd\x71\x15\x49\x44\xce"
+    "\x83\xb6\x05\xfb\x7d\x30\xb5\x57\x2c\x31\x4f\xfc"
+    "\xfe\x80\xb6\xc0\x13\x0c\x5b\x9b\x2e\x8f\x3d\xfc"
+    "\xc2\xa3\x0c\x11\x1b\x80\x5f\xf3",
+    /* .expectedlen = */ 128,
+    /* .entropyreseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .entropyreseed_len = */ 0,
+    /* .addtl_reseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtl_reseed_len = */ 0
+  },
+  {
+    /* .flags = */ "aes sym128 pr", /* DRBG_PR_CTRAES128 */
+    /* .entropy = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x92\x89\x8f\x31\xfa\x1c\xff\x6d\x18\x2f\x26\x06"
+    "\x43\xdf\xf8\x18\xc2\xa4\xd9\x72\xc3\xb9\xb6\x97",
+    /* .entropylen = */ 24,
+    /* .entpra = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x20\x72\x8a\x06\xf8\x6f\x8d\xd4\x41\xe2\x72\xb7"
+    "\xc4\x2c\xe8\x10",
+    /* .entprb = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x3d\xb0\xf0\x94\xf3\x05\x50\x33\x17\x86\x3e\x22"
+    "\x08\xf7\xa5\x01",
+    /* .entprlen = */ 16,
+    /* .addtla = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x1a\x40\xfa\xe3\xcc\x6c\x7c\xa0\xf8\xda\xba\x59"
+    "\x23\x6d\xad\x1d",
+    /* .addtlb = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x9f\x72\x76\x6c\xc7\x46\xe5\xed\x2e\x53\x20\x12"
+    "\xbc\x59\x31\x8c",
+    /* .addtllen = */ 16,
+    /* .pers = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xea\x65\xee\x60\x26\x4e\x7e\xb6\x0e\x82\x68\xc4"
+    "\x37\x3c\x5c\x0b",
+    /* .perslen = */ 16,
+    /* .expected = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x5a\x35\x39\x87\x0f\x4d\x22\xa4\x09\x24\xee\x71"
+    "\xc9\x6f\xac\x72\x0a\xd6\xf0\x88\x82\xd0\x83\x28"
+    "\x73\xec\x3f\x93\xd8\xab\x45\x23\xf0\x7e\xac\x45"
+    "\x14\x5e\x93\x9f\xb1\xd6\x76\x43\x3d\xb6\xe8\x08"
+    "\x88\xf6\xda\x89\x08\x77\x42\xfe\x1a\xf4\x3f\xc4"
+    "\x23\xc5\x1f\x68",
+    /* .expectedlen = */ 64,
+    /* .entropyreseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .entropyreseed_len = */ 0,
+    /* .addtl_reseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtl_reseed_len = */ 0
+   }
+};
+
+struct gcry_drbg_test_vector drbg_test_nopr[] = {
+  {
+    /* .flags = */ "sha256" /* DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA256 */,
+    /* .entropy = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x73\xd3\xfb\xa3\x94\x5f\x2b\x5f\xb9\x8f\xf6\x9c"
+    "\x8a\x93\x17\xae\x19\xc3\x4c\xc3\xd6\xca\xa3\x2d"
+    "\x16\xfc\x42\xd2\x2d\xd5\x6f\x56\xcc\x1d\x30\xff"
+    "\x9e\x06\x3e\x09\xce\x58\xe6\x9a\x35\xb3\xa6\x56",
+    /* .entropylen = */ 48,
+    /* .entpra = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprb = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprlen = */ 0,
+    /* .addtla = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xf4\xd5\x98\x3d\xa8\xfc\xfa\x37\xb7\x54\x67\x73"
+    "\xc7\xc3\xdd\x47\x34\x71\x02\x5d\xc1\xa0\xd3\x10"
+    "\xc1\x8b\xbd\xf5\x66\x34\x6f\xdd",
+    /* .addtlb = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xf7\x9e\x6a\x56\x0e\x73\xe9\xd9\x7a\xd1\x69\xe0"
+    "\x6f\x8c\x55\x1c\x44\xd1\xce\x6f\x28\xcc\xa4\x4d"
+    "\xa8\xc0\x85\xd1\x5a\x0c\x59\x40",
+    /* .addtllen = */ 32,
+    /* .pers = */ NULL,
+    /* .perslen = */ 0,
+    /* .expected = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x71\x7b\x93\x46\x1a\x40\xaa\x35\xa4\xaa\xc5\xe7"
+    "\x6d\x5b\x5b\x8a\xa0\xdf\x39\x7d\xae\x71\x58\x5b"
+    "\x3c\x7c\xb4\xf0\x89\xfa\x4a\x8c\xa9\x5c\x54\xc0"
+    "\x40\xdf\xbc\xce\x26\x81\x34\xf8\xba\x7d\x1c\xe8"
+    "\xad\x21\xe0\x74\xcf\x48\x84\x30\x1f\xa1\xd5\x4f"
+    "\x81\x42\x2f\xf4\xdb\x0b\x23\xf8\x73\x27\xb8\x1d"
+    "\x42\xf8\x44\x58\xd8\x5b\x29\x27\x0a\xf8\x69\x59"
+    "\xb5\x78\x44\xeb\x9e\xe0\x68\x6f\x42\x9a\xb0\x5b"
+    "\xe0\x4e\xcb\x6a\xaa\xe2\xd2\xd5\x33\x25\x3e\xe0"
+    "\x6c\xc7\x6a\x07\xa5\x03\x83\x9f\xe2\x8b\xd1\x1c"
+    "\x70\xa8\x07\x59\x97\xeb\xf6\xbe",
+    /* .expectedlen = */ 128,
+    /* .entropyreseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .entropyreseed_len = */ 0,
+    /* .addtl_reseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtl_reseed_len = */ 0
+  },
+  {
+    /* .flags = */ "hmac sha256" /* DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA256 */,
+    /* .entropy = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x8d\xf0\x13\xb4\xd1\x03\x52\x30\x73\x91\x7d\xdf"
+    "\x6a\x86\x97\x93\x05\x9e\x99\x43\xfc\x86\x54\x54"
+    "\x9e\x7a\xb2\x2f\x7c\x29\xf1\x22\xda\x26\x25\xaf"
+    "\x2d\xdd\x4a\xbc\xce\x3c\xf4\xfa\x46\x59\xd8\x4e",
+    /* .entropylen = */ 48,
+    /* .entpra = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprb = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprlen = */ 0,
+    /* .addtla = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtlb = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtllen = */ 0,
+    /* .pers = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xb5\x71\xe6\x6d\x7c\x33\x8b\xc0\x7b\x76\xad\x37"
+    "\x57\xbb\x2f\x94\x52\xbf\x7e\x07\x43\x7a\xe8\x58"
+    "\x1c\xe7\xbc\x7c\x3a\xc6\x51\xa9",
+    /* .perslen = */ 32,
+    /* .expected = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xb9\x1c\xba\x4c\xc8\x4f\xa2\x5d\xf8\x61\x0b\x81"
+    "\xb6\x41\x40\x27\x68\xa2\x09\x72\x34\x93\x2e\x37"
+    "\xd5\x90\xb1\x15\x4c\xbd\x23\xf9\x74\x52\xe3\x10"
+    "\xe2\x91\xc4\x51\x46\x14\x7f\x0d\xa2\xd8\x17\x61"
+    "\xfe\x90\xfb\xa6\x4f\x94\x41\x9c\x0f\x66\x2b\x28"
+    "\xc1\xed\x94\xda\x48\x7b\xb7\xe7\x3e\xec\x79\x8f"
+    "\xbc\xf9\x81\xb7\x91\xd1\xbe\x4f\x17\x7a\x89\x07"
+    "\xaa\x3c\x40\x16\x43\xa5\xb6\x2b\x87\xb8\x9d\x66"
+    "\xb3\xa6\x0e\x40\xd4\xa8\xe4\xe9\xd8\x2a\xf6\xd2"
+    "\x70\x0e\x6f\x53\x5c\xdb\x51\xf7\x5c\x32\x17\x29"
+    "\x10\x37\x41\x03\x0c\xcc\x3a\x56",
+    /* .expectedlen = */ 128,
+    /* .entropyreseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .entropyreseed_len = */ 0,
+    /* .addtl_reseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtl_reseed_len = */ 0
+  },
+  {
+    /* .flags = */ "aes sym128" /* DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES128 */,
+    /* .entropy = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xc0\x70\x1f\x92\x50\x75\x8f\xcd\xf2\xbe\x73\x98"
+    "\x80\xdb\x66\xeb\x14\x68\xb4\xa5\x87\x9c\x2d\xa6",
+    /* .entropylen = */ 24,
+    /* .entpra = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprb = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprlen = */ 0,
+    /* .addtla = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xf9\x01\xf8\x16\x7a\x1d\xff\xde\x8e\x3c\x83\xe2"
+    "\x44\x85\xe7\xfe",
+    /* .addtlb = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x17\x1c\x09\x38\xc2\x38\x9f\x97\x87\x60\x55\xb4"
+    "\x82\x16\x62\x7f",
+    /* .addtllen = */ 16,
+    /* .pers = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x80\x08\xae\xe8\xe9\x69\x40\xc5\x08\x73\xc7\x9f"
+    "\x8e\xcf\xe0\x02",
+    /* .perslen = */ 16,
+    /* .expected = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x97\xc0\xc0\xe5\xa0\xcc\xf2\x4f\x33\x63\x48\x8a"
+    "\xdb\x13\x0a\x35\x89\xbf\x80\x65\x62\xee\x13\x95"
+    "\x7c\x33\xd3\x7d\xf4\x07\x77\x7a\x2b\x65\x0b\x5f"
+    "\x45\x5c\x13\xf1\x90\x77\x7f\xc5\x04\x3f\xcc\x1a"
+    "\x38\xf8\xcd\x1b\xbb\xd5\x57\xd1\x4a\x4c\x2e\x8a"
+    "\x2b\x49\x1e\x5c",
+    /* .expectedlen = */ 64,
+    /* .entropyreseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .entropyreseed_len = */ 0,
+    /* .addtl_reseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtl_reseed_len = */ 0
+  },
+  {
+    /* .flags = */ "sha1" /* DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA1 */,
+    /* .entropy = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x16\x10\xb8\x28\xcc\xd2\x7d\xe0\x8c\xee\xa0\x32"
+    "\xa2\x0e\x92\x08\x49\x2c\xf1\x70\x92\x42\xf6\xb5",
+    /* .entropylen = */ 24,
+    /* .entpra = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprb = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprlen = */ 0,
+    /* .addtla = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtlb = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtllen = */ 0,
+    /* .pers = */ NULL,
+    /* .perslen = */ 0,
+    /* .expected = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x56\xf3\x3d\x4f\xdb\xb9\xa5\xb6\x4d\x26\x23\x44"
+    "\x97\xe9\xdc\xb8\x77\x98\xc6\x8d\x08\xf7\xc4\x11"
+    "\x99\xd4\xbd\xdf\x97\xeb\xbf\x6c\xb5\x55\x0e\x5d"
+    "\x14\x9f\xf4\xd5\xbd\x0f\x05\xf2\x5a\x69\x88\xc1"
+    "\x74\x36\x39\x62\x27\x18\x4a\xf8\x4a\x56\x43\x35"
+    "\x65\x8e\x2f\x85\x72\xbe\xa3\x33\xee\xe2\xab\xff"
+    "\x22\xff\xa6\xde\x3e\x22\xac\xa2",
+    /* .expectedlen = */ 80,
+    /* .entropyreseed = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x72\xd2\x8c\x90\x8e\xda\xf9\xa4\xd1\xe5\x26\xd8"
+    "\xf2\xde\xd5\x44",
+    /* .entropyreseed_len = */ 16,
+    /* .addtl_reseed = */ NULL,
+    /* .addtl_reseed_len = */ 0
+  },
+  {
+    /* .flags = */ "sha1" /* DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA1 */,
+    /* .entropy = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xd9\xba\xb5\xce\xdc\xa9\x6f\x61\x78\xd6\x45\x09"
+    "\xa0\xdf\xdc\x5e\xda\xd8\x98\x94\x14\x45\x0e\x01",
+    /* .entropylen = */ 24,
+    /* .entpra = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprb = */ NULL,
+    /* .entprlen = */ 0,
+    /* .addtla = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x04\xfa\x28\x95\xaa\x5a\x6f\x8c\x57\x43\x34\x3b"
+    "\x80\x5e\x5e\xa4",
+    /* .addtlb = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xdf\x5d\xc4\x59\xdf\xf0\x2a\xa2\xf0\x52\xd7\x21"
+    "\xec\x60\x72\x30",
+    /* .addtllen = */ 16,
+    /* .pers = */ NULL,
+    /* .perslen = */ 0,
+    /* .expected = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xc4\x8b\x89\xf9\xda\x3f\x74\x82\x45\x55\x5d\x5d"
+    "\x03\x3b\x69\x3d\xd7\x1a\x4d\xf5\x69\x02\x05\xce"
+    "\xfc\xd7\x20\x11\x3c\xc2\x4e\x09\x89\x36\xff\x5e"
+    "\x77\xb5\x41\x53\x58\x70\xb3\x39\x46\x8c\xdd\x8d"
+    "\x6f\xaf\x8c\x56\x16\x3a\x70\x0a\x75\xb2\x3e\x59"
+    "\x9b\x5a\xec\xf1\x6f\x3b\xaf\x6d\x5f\x24\x19\x97"
+    "\x1f\x24\xf4\x46\x72\x0f\xea\xbe",
+    /* .expectedlen = */ 80,
+    /* .entropyreseed = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\xc6\xba\xd0\x74\xc5\x90\x67\x86\xf5\xe1\xf3\x20"
+    "\x99\xf5\xb4\x91",
+    /* .entropyreseed_len = */ 16,
+    /* .addtl_reseed = */ (unsigned char *)
+    "\x3e\x6b\xf4\x6f\x4d\xaa\x38\x25\xd7\x19\x4e\x69"
+    "\x4e\x77\x52\xf7",
+    /* .addtl_reseed_len = */ 16
+  }
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * Tests implement the CAVS test approach as documented in
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/DRBGVS.pdf
+ */
+
+/*
+ * CAVS test
+ *
+ * This function is not static as it is needed for as a private API
+ * call for the CAVS test tool.
+ */
+gpg_err_code_t
+_gcry_rngdrbg_cavs_test (struct gcry_drbg_test_vector *test, unsigned char *buf)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = 0;
+  drbg_state_t drbg = NULL;
+  struct drbg_test_data_s test_data;
+  drbg_string_t addtl, pers, testentropy;
+  int coreref = 0;
+  int pr = 0;
+  u32 flags;
+
+  ret = parse_flag_string (test->flagstr, &flags);
+  if (ret)
+    goto outbuf;
+
+  ret = drbg_algo_available (flags, &coreref);
+  if (ret)
+    goto outbuf;
+
+  drbg = xtrycalloc_secure (1, sizeof *drbg);
+  if (!drbg)
+    {
+      ret = gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+      goto outbuf;
+    }
+
+  if ((flags & DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST))
+    pr = 1;
+
+  test_data.testentropy = &testentropy;
+  drbg_string_fill (&testentropy, test->entropy, test->entropylen);
+  drbg->test_data = &test_data;
+  drbg_string_fill (&pers, test->pers, test->perslen);
+  ret = drbg_instantiate (drbg, &pers, coreref, pr);
+  if (ret)
+    goto outbuf;
+
+  if (test->entropyreseed)
+    {
+      drbg_string_fill (&testentropy, test->entropyreseed,
+			     test->entropyreseed_len);
+      drbg_string_fill (&addtl, test->addtl_reseed,
+			     test->addtl_reseed_len);
+      if (drbg_reseed (drbg, &addtl))
+	goto outbuf;
+    }
+
+  drbg_string_fill (&addtl, test->addtla, test->addtllen);
+  if (test->entpra)
+    {
+      drbg_string_fill (&testentropy, test->entpra, test->entprlen);
+      drbg->test_data = &test_data;
+    }
+  drbg_generate_long (drbg, buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl);
+
+  drbg_string_fill (&addtl, test->addtlb, test->addtllen);
+  if (test->entprb)
+    {
+      drbg_string_fill (&testentropy, test->entprb, test->entprlen);
+      drbg->test_data = &test_data;
+    }
+  drbg_generate_long (drbg, buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl);
+  drbg_uninstantiate (drbg);
+
+ outbuf:
+  xfree (drbg);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invoke the CAVS test and perform the final check whether the
+ * calculated random value matches the expected one.
+ *
+ * This function is not static as it is needed for as a private API
+ * call for the CAVS test tool.
+ */
+gpg_err_code_t
+_gcry_rngdrbg_healthcheck_one (struct gcry_drbg_test_vector * test)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_ENOMEM;
+  unsigned char *buf = xcalloc_secure (1, test->expectedlen);
+  if (!buf)
+    return GPG_ERR_ENOMEM;
+
+  ret = _gcry_rngdrbg_cavs_test (test, buf);
+  /* FIXME: The next line is wrong.   */
+  ret = memcmp (test->expected, buf, test->expectedlen);
+
+  xfree (buf);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tests as defined in 11.3.2 in addition to the cipher tests: testing
+ * of the error handling.
+ *
+ * Note, testing the reseed counter is not done as an automatic reseeding
+ * is performed in drbg_generate when the reseed counter is too large.
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_healthcheck_sanity (struct gcry_drbg_test_vector *test)
+{
+  unsigned int len = 0;
+  drbg_state_t drbg = NULL;
+  gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+  gpg_err_code_t tmpret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+  struct drbg_test_data_s test_data;
+  drbg_string_t addtl, testentropy;
+  int coreref = 0;
+  unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+  size_t max_addtllen, max_request_bytes;
+  u32 flags;
+
+  /* only perform test in FIPS mode */
+  if (0 == fips_mode ())
+    return 0;
+
+  ret = parse_flag_string (test->flagstr, &flags);
+  if (ret)
+    return ret;
+  ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Fixme: Improve handling of RET.  */
+
+  buf = xtrycalloc_secure (1, test->expectedlen);
+  if (!buf)
+    return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+  tmpret = drbg_algo_available (flags, &coreref);
+  if (tmpret)
+    goto outbuf;
+  drbg = xtrycalloc_secure (1, sizeof *drbg);
+  if (!drbg)
+    {
+      ret = gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+      goto outbuf;
+    }
+
+  /* if the following tests fail, it is likely that there is a buffer
+   * overflow and we get a SIGSEV */
+  ret = drbg_instantiate (drbg, NULL, coreref, 1);
+  if (ret)
+    goto outbuf;
+  max_addtllen = drbg_max_addtl ();
+  max_request_bytes = drbg_max_request_bytes ();
+  /* overflow addtllen with additional info string */
+  drbg_string_fill (&addtl, test->addtla, (max_addtllen + 1));
+  len = drbg_generate (drbg, buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl);
+  if (len)
+    goto outdrbg;
+
+  /* overflow max_bits */
+  len = drbg_generate (drbg, buf, (max_request_bytes + 1), NULL);
+  if (len)
+    goto outdrbg;
+  drbg_uninstantiate (drbg);
+
+  /* test failing entropy source as defined in 11.3.2 */
+  test_data.testentropy = NULL;
+  test_data.fail_seed_source = 1;
+  drbg->test_data = &test_data;
+  tmpret = drbg_instantiate (drbg, NULL, coreref, 0);
+  if (!tmpret)
+    goto outdrbg;
+  test_data.fail_seed_source = 0;
+
+  test_data.testentropy = &testentropy;
+  drbg_string_fill (&testentropy, test->entropy, test->entropylen);
+  /* overflow max addtllen with personalization string */
+  tmpret = drbg_instantiate (drbg, &addtl, coreref, 0);
+  if (!tmpret)
+    goto outdrbg;
+
+  dbg (("DRBG: Sanity tests for failure code paths successfully completed\n"));
+  ret = 0;
+
+ outdrbg:
+  drbg_uninstantiate (drbg);
+ outbuf:
+  xfree (buf);
+  xfree (drbg);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DRBG Healthcheck function as required in SP800-90A
+ *
+ * return:
+ * 	0 on success (all tests pass)
+ * 	>0 on error (return code indicate the number of failures)
+ */
+static int
+drbg_healthcheck (void)
+{
+  int ret = 0;
+  ret += _gcry_rngdrbg_healthcheck_one (&drbg_test_nopr[0]);
+  ret += _gcry_rngdrbg_healthcheck_one (&drbg_test_nopr[1]);
+  ret += _gcry_rngdrbg_healthcheck_one (&drbg_test_nopr[2]);
+  ret += _gcry_rngdrbg_healthcheck_one (&drbg_test_nopr[3]);
+  ret += _gcry_rngdrbg_healthcheck_one (&drbg_test_nopr[4]);
+  ret += _gcry_rngdrbg_healthcheck_one (&drbg_test_pr[0]);
+  ret += _gcry_rngdrbg_healthcheck_one (&drbg_test_pr[1]);
+  ret += _gcry_rngdrbg_healthcheck_one (&drbg_test_pr[2]);
+  ret += drbg_healthcheck_sanity (&drbg_test_nopr[0]);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Run the self-tests.  */
+gcry_error_t
+_gcry_rngdrbg_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+  gcry_err_code_t ec;
+  const char *errtxt = NULL;
+  drbg_lock ();
+  if (0 != drbg_healthcheck ())
+    errtxt = "RNG output does not match known value";
+  drbg_unlock ();
+  if (report && errtxt)
+    report ("random", 0, "KAT", errtxt);
+  ec = errtxt ? GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED : 0;
+  return gpg_error (ec);
+}
+
+/***************************************************************
+ * Cipher invocations requested by DRBG
+ ***************************************************************/
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hash_init (drbg_state_t drbg)
+{
+  gcry_md_hd_t hd;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  err = _gcry_md_open (&hd, drbg->core->backend_cipher, 0);
+  if (err)
+    return err;
+
+  drbg->priv_data = hd;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hmac_init (drbg_state_t drbg)
+{
+  gcry_md_hd_t hd;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  err = _gcry_md_open (&hd, drbg->core->backend_cipher, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
+  if (err)
+    return err;
+
+  drbg->priv_data = hd;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_hmac_setkey (drbg_state_t drbg, const unsigned char *key)
+{
+  gcry_md_hd_t hd = (gcry_md_hd_t)drbg->priv_data;
+
+  return _gcry_md_setkey (hd, key, drbg_statelen (drbg));
+}
+
+static void
+drbg_hash_fini (drbg_state_t drbg)
+{
+  gcry_md_hd_t hd = (gcry_md_hd_t)drbg->priv_data;
+
+  _gcry_md_close (hd);
+}
+
+static byte *
+drbg_hash (drbg_state_t drbg, const drbg_string_t *buf)
+{
+  gcry_md_hd_t hd = (gcry_md_hd_t)drbg->priv_data;
+
+  _gcry_md_reset(hd);
+  for (; NULL != buf; buf = buf->next)
+    _gcry_md_write (hd, buf->buf, buf->len);
+  _gcry_md_final (hd);
+  return _gcry_md_read (hd, drbg->core->backend_cipher);
+}
+
+static void
+drbg_sym_fini (drbg_state_t drbg)
+{
+  gcry_cipher_hd_t hd = (gcry_cipher_hd_t)drbg->priv_data;
+
+  if (hd)
+    _gcry_cipher_close (hd);
+  if (drbg->ctr_handle)
+    _gcry_cipher_close (drbg->ctr_handle);
+  if (drbg->ctr_null)
+    free(drbg->ctr_null);
+}
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_sym_init (drbg_state_t drbg)
+{
+  gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  drbg->ctr_null = calloc(1, DRBG_CTR_NULL_LEN);
+  if (!drbg->ctr_null)
+    return GPG_ERR_ENOMEM;
+
+  err = _gcry_cipher_open (&hd, drbg->core->backend_cipher,
+			   GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB, 0);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      drbg_sym_fini (drbg);
+      return err;
+    }
+  drbg->priv_data = hd;
+
+  err = _gcry_cipher_open (&drbg->ctr_handle, drbg->core->backend_cipher,
+			   GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, 0);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      drbg_sym_fini (drbg);
+      return err;
+    }
+
+
+  if (drbg_blocklen (drbg) !=
+      _gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (drbg->core->backend_cipher))
+    {
+      drbg_sym_fini (drbg);
+      return -GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_sym_setkey (drbg_state_t drbg, const unsigned char *key)
+{
+  gcry_cipher_hd_t hd = (gcry_cipher_hd_t)drbg->priv_data;
+
+  return _gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, key, drbg_keylen (drbg));
+}
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_sym (drbg_state_t drbg, unsigned char *outval, const drbg_string_t *buf)
+{
+  gcry_cipher_hd_t hd = (gcry_cipher_hd_t)drbg->priv_data;
+
+  _gcry_cipher_reset(hd);
+  if (drbg_blocklen (drbg) < buf->len)
+    return -GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
+  /* in is only component */
+  return _gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, outval, drbg_blocklen (drbg), buf->buf,
+			       buf->len);
+}
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+drbg_sym_ctr (drbg_state_t drbg,
+	      const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inbuflen,
+	      unsigned char *outbuf, unsigned int outbuflen)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  _gcry_cipher_reset(drbg->ctr_handle);
+  err = _gcry_cipher_setctr(drbg->ctr_handle, drbg->V, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+  if (err)
+    return err;
+
+  while (outbuflen)
+    {
+       unsigned int cryptlen = (inbuflen > outbuflen) ? outbuflen : inbuflen;
+
+       err = _gcry_cipher_encrypt (drbg->ctr_handle, outbuf, cryptlen, inbuf,
+				   cryptlen);
+       if (err)
+         return err;
+
+       outbuflen -= cryptlen;
+       outbuf += cryptlen;
+    }
+  return _gcry_cipher_getctr(drbg->ctr_handle, drbg->V, drbg_blocklen (drbg));
+}